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Abstract. Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability 
Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO 
Section and the Safeguards Concepts and Planning Division of the IAEA to develop a revised 
methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy 
system (NES). With the common understanding that there is “no proliferation resistance without 
safeguards” the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new “User Requirement” for 
“safeguardability” that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards 
including “Safeguards-by-Design” principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has 
been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a “Basic Principle” in the area of proliferation 
resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards:  1) Do a State’s legal commitments, 
policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a 
legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the 
effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire 
approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for 
improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the 
safeguardability of a NES using a layered “Evaluation Questionnaire” that defines Evaluation Parameters 
(EP), EP-related questions, and Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the 
evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the 
identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path analysis), 
and the identification of safeguards tools and measures to meet facility or activity specific safeguards 
objectives. The usefulness of this approach has been preliminarily tested and demonstrated in a case study 




The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) was established in 
2000 – as an IAEA flagship project, through a General Conference resolution – to help ensure that nuclear 
energy is available to contribute to meeting the energy needs of the 21st century in a sustainable manner. 
INPRO’s activities are centered on the key concepts of global nuclear energy sustainability and the 
development of long-range nuclear energy strategies, so that nuclear energy is and remains available to 
meet national energy needs. Within the INPRO concept of sustainability, Proliferation Resistance (PR) is 
one of the INPRO subject areas [1] evaluated in a nuclear energy system assessment (NESA). 
 
The INPRO sustainability assessment methodology in the area of proliferation resistance has evolved over 
the years, with the INPRO Collaborative Project (CP) Proliferation Resistance: Acquisition/Diversion 
Pathway Analysis (PRADA) [3], which was completed in 2010, representing an important milestone. A 
main conclusion of that CP was that the robustness of barriers to proliferation is not a function of the 
number of barriers or of their individual characteristics but is an integrated function of these and can be 
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measured by determining whether the safeguards goals can be met. Consequently, key issues in the 
proliferation resistance assessment process became the State’s legal framework that enables the IAEA to 
achieve its safeguards objectives, and “safeguardability” that can be described as a property of a nuclear 
system, based on design features and operational modalities, that facilitate effective and efficient 
safeguards implementation. 
 
2. RESISTANCE BASIC PRINCIPLE, USER REQUIREMENTS, AND CRITERIA IN THE 
AREA OF PROLIFERATION 
 
The proliferation resistance sustainability assessment process proposed by PROSA follows the same 
structure as the INPRO Methodology with one Basic Principle (BP), three supporting User Requirements 
(UR), and corresponding Criteria (CR) with Indicators (IN), Acceptance Limits (AL), and Evaluation 
Parameters (EP). 
 
In line with IAEA-STR-332 [4], which defines proliferation resistance as: “that characteristic of a 
nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material, or misuse 
of technology, by States in order to acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices”, the BP remains 
essentially unchanged from IAEA-TECDOC-1575 [2]: “Proliferation resistance intrinsic features and 
extrinsic measures shall be implemented throughout the full life cycle for [nuclear energy systems] to help 
ensure that [NESs] will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear 
weapons program. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential, and neither shall be 
considered sufficient by itself”. Since no proliferation-proof NES is possible so long as special fissionable 
material (SFM) is involved in significant quantities (SQs), extrinsic proliferation resistance measures – 
various institutional controls and verification measures – will remain essential, even in case of an 
increased level of effectiveness of intrinsic features. 
 
Intrinsic design features that may affect barriers against proliferation, such as low levels of uranium 
enrichment or a lack of isotope or chemical separation technologies within the NES, cannot independently 
address the objective of preventing proliferation. At a minimum, transparent verification of materials, 
facilities and activities is the only certain approach to create assurance of peaceful use. Effective and 
efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards will remain an essential part of proliferation resistance and a 
legal requirement for the operation of a NES in Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [5] and a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) [6]. Ultimately, the 
robustness of barriers against proliferation, built by intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, is determined 
by the possibility for the IAEA to achieve its safeguards objectives [3]. 
 
3. The PROSA Proliferation Resistance Assessment Process 
 
The PROSA PR assessment process is intended for NESA self-assessments performed by national subject 
matter experts, and potentially on assessments by designers/vendors of a NES facility or activity. The 
assessment has been devised as a linear process, evaluating the NES against the “Basic Principle” in the 
area of proliferation resistance, which ultimately leads to the conclusion that the “NES is or is not in 
agreement with the INPRO Basic Principle in the area of proliferation resistance” [8]. Even so, the 
primary value of the assessment is not the top level conclusion, but rather, to gain an appreciation of 
where gaps exist at Criteria and Evaluation Parameter level, thereby suggesting directions to pursue to 
improve long term sustainability of the NES. PROSA replaces a previous approach of “ranking” PR using 
semi-quantitative evaluation scales, from “very weak” to “very strong”, in favour of a questionnaire 
approach to clearly identify gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvement and needs for 
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Questions considered in the assessment process include:  
- Does the NES provide unirradiated direct use material (by diversion or misuse) that can be used for a 
nuclear weapon? 
- Do the State’s commitments, obligations and policies allow the IAEA to provide credible assurance of 
the exclusively peaceful use of the nuclear energy system (NES)? 
- Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards?  
- Can all plausible acquisition paths be covered by intrinsic features compatible with other design 
requirements, and extrinsic measures that are suitable to reduce the attractiveness for a proliferator 
to use these acquisition paths? 
 
The first Question is part of “NES PR Information Catalogue” compiled by the assessor regarding the 
nuclear material, facilities and technologies in the NES.  
 
The second question is associated with UR1, assessment of the State’s commitments, obligations and 
policies regarding non-proliferation. The assessor is asked to respond to a list of questions that evaluate 
whether the State’s legal commitments, obligations and policies are sufficient on the whole to provide a 
basis for credible assurance of the exclusive peaceful use of the NES – including a legal basis for 
verification activities implemented by the IAEA. It should be noted that the NES has a gap in 
sustainability as defined in the INPRO Methodology if a given State has a CSA in force [6] without an AP 
[7]; in that case, the IAEA is not able to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear 
material and activities in the State as a whole. 
 
The third question is associated with UR3, the facilitation of “easy detection” of diversion of nuclear 
material and/or misuse of nuclear facilities. It is implied that implementation of safeguards should avoid 
unnecessary impacts on operations and respect the principle of acceptable cost efficiency. Safeguards-by-
design (SBD) principles are considered to be good practice.  
 
Following the BP finally the assessor is asked to examine the coverage of the NES and each plausible 




4. Testing “Safeguardability” by a NESA Assessor 
 
Safeguardability can be described as a property of a nuclear system that is based on design features and 
operational modalities that facilitate effective and efficient safeguards implementation. In this context it is 
understood by the IAEA Department of Safeguards “that through careful planning safeguards systems 
and processes could be implemented that could increase the capability of safeguards organizations to 
detect the diversion of nuclear material and the misuse of a facility more effectively and efficiently, could 
be less intrusive to facility operators, and potentially could result in a lower total cost to the stakeholders” 
[9] 
 
The PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered “Evaluation Questionnaire”.  
The assessment of UR3 answers the questions: 1) “does design and operation of the NES facilitate the 
implementation of effective IAEA safeguards”, and 2) “can safeguards objectives be met efficiently”. In 
safeguards terminology, effectiveness addresses verification of the completeness and correctness of States’ 
declarations, while efficiency considers the optimization of cost and resource burdens of implementation. 
In terms of safeguards, this means that effective safeguards can be implemented with a minimum 
acceptable (or practicable) expenditure of time, resources (including money) and effort. 
 
The assessment is largely focused on facilities. The depth of analysis required leading to the conclusion 
that (IAEA) safeguards is/can be implemented effectively and efficiently depends on the status of the 
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nuclear programme (e.g. whether the State is embarking on nuclear power or has an existing NES) and on 
the technology selected (e.g. proven, evolutionary or innovative technology, material category, item or 
bulk handling facilities, etc.).  
 
In the case of proven technology, listing one or more technically comparable cases of implementation 
under comparable safeguards regime circumstances can make a positive finding. For example, if a reactor 
is to be installed and its site specific design requirements do not impact the safeguards approach 
previously implemented elsewhere on the same reactor design (under comparable safeguards regime 
conditions), then a preliminary finding can be made that effective safeguards can be implemented and the 
supporting evidence is the particulars of the comparable installation with previously implemented 
safeguards. This is the simplest case of a comparative assessment of safeguards effectiveness. For a 
country embarking on nuclear power such a test might be sufficient, and the evidence can be provided by 
the vendor.  
 
Evolutionary technology requires by the designer and safeguards experts first an analysis of the impact of 
design differences on diversion paths: alteration of existing or even additional diversion paths. Secondly, 
it requires an analysis of the impact of design differences on safeguards implementation: on Physical 
Inventory Verification (PIV), on Interim Inventory Verification (IIV), on Inventory Change Verification, 
on Design Information Verification (DIV), and on the application of Containment/Surveillance (C/S) 
measures. To perform such kind of comparative assessment “Facility Safeguardability Assessment 
Screening Questions” [10, 11] have been proposed.  
 
In the case of new construction, PROSA recommends the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept, an 
approach whereby international safeguards requirements and objectives are fully integrated into the design 
process of a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction, operation and 
decommissioning [12]. Fully-integrated means, inter alia, that safeguards requirements are included in the 
formal facility design optimization process. This includes design and construction issues such as locations 
of potential measurement stations and tamper indicating seals, cabling pre-installation, containment 
considerations, penetrations, as well as camera views and lighting. 
 
Once a determination is made that the installation under consideration in an NES is based on evolutionary 
or innovative technologies, a preliminary determination can be made regarding the technical readiness of 
IAEA certified instrumentation [13] to support safeguards implementation on the proposed installation. 
  
Novel facility technology or processes require a detailed analysis starting in the conceptual design phase 
with a facility level coarse diversion path (diversion strategy) analysis in the same tenor as the SBD-
process (from the initial planning through the design, construction, operation and decommissioning). This 
analysis entails a consideration of (hypothetical) schemes which a State could use to divert or to misuse 
nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards. Each diversion strategy may include one or more 
concealment methods. The purpose of a coarse diversion path analysis at this stage is to determine 
whether appropriate safeguards measures exist to provide sufficient detection capabilities. For the 
optimization of the design and operation of a facility a detailed diversion path analysis can be useful  
 
PROSA proposes two complementary approaches for the analysis of the installation/facility to test the 
safeguardability. One approach is the comparative assessment considering the safeguards relevant 
similarities between existing and novel technology, which provides insights for the SBD-process. A 
second approach is to use a safeguardability checklist “to determine that the system’s design facilitates all 
the activities related to the implementation of nuclear safeguards by the IAEA” [14].  
 
Table 1 and 2 summarize the Evaluation Questionnaire, illustrative tests [14] and screening questions [10, 
11] for the safeguardability of a NES. 
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Table 1: Typical Evaluation Questionnaire 
Evaluation Parameter Question Finding 
EP3.1.1 
The accounting system, 
required by the SSAC and 
implemented by the operator 
provides accurate and 
complete information on 
nuclear materials, forms, 
amounts, flows, locations, 
transfers and identification of 
inventory changes 
Procedures for Inventory Taking have been 
established equal to good practice [15] 
yes no 
Nuclear material (NM) inventories are properly 
tagged and identifiable 
yes no 
International Standards of Accounting are met [16] yes no 




Table 2:  Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions for the assessment of the safeguardability of a NES 
Generic Safeguardability Test [14]  Comparative Approach [10,11] 
EP3.1.1  
 
Procedures for Inventory 
Taking (PIT) have been 
established equal to best 
practice  [15] 
 EP3.1.1  
 
Procedures for Inventory 
Taking (PIT) have been 
established equal to best 
practice  [15] 
Test The foreseen PIT procedures 
can take into account all 
relevant needs 
 Question Does this design lessen the 
efficiency of PIT by the 
operator or the effectiveness of 
PIV by the IAEA 
The NMAC system has follow-
up / tracking functions that 
provide timely information 
about the locations and 
characteristics of all NM in the 
system 
 Does this design impair the 
ability of the operator to 
produce timely and accurate 
interim inventory declarations 
 International Standards of 
Accounting [16] are met 
  International Standards of 
Accounting [16] are met 
Test It is possible to carry out 
measurement activities with 
accurate and precise 
quantification of the material 
that will be referred to in 
accounting declarations 
 Question Does the design/process employ 
nuclear material types, 
categories, or forms that are 
more difficult to measure 
accurately at IKMP? If so, can 
the plant accountancy 
measurement system meet 
International Target Values 
(ITV) for the PIT 
The amount of hidden inventory 




Besides the effectiveness of safeguards implementation, the other aspect of safeguardability is efficiency. 
For an evaluation of efficiency, PROSA proposes a comparative approach. Absolute comparison of cost 
values does not provide a useful result because each cost assessment is State-, facility- and activity-
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dependent. This is especially true for the overall facility size (throughput), for labor costs and possible 
losses in production on the operator’s part, as well as for the travel costs for IAEA inspectors and 
technicians. In addition, the number of inspectors required for verification depends on the safeguards 
agreements in force (the facility attachments in place) between the IAEA and the State (e.g., whether a 
type of “Partnership Approach” that shares the work and costs exists or not can have a significant 
influence).  
 
For the owner/operator of a nuclear facility, “efficiency of safeguards implementation” means 
acceptable/minimal cost/burden both in construction capital investments and in operation. Relevant costs 
for the owner/operator of a nuclear facility, caused by the difficulties in implementation of IAEA 
safeguards, that go beyond normal construction and operating costs include (but may not be limited to): 
• Back fitting of nuclear installations to meet safeguards requirements, 
• Interference with normal operation, 
o Additional outages due to PIV/IIV 
o Restrictions in operation with impact on the operational capacity 
• Need for additional facility-owned equipment enabling verification at PIV/IIV. 
 
For safeguards authorities, “efficiency of safeguards implementation” refers to facility-specific, affordable 
costs in terms of manpower (inspection, analysis and technical support staff), safeguards equipment, and 
use of analytical laboratory facilities. Assessing the efficiency of the implementation of IAEA safeguards 
may require consultation with the IAEA Department of Safeguards (SG). 
 
5. Case Study 
 
To illustrate the proposed PROSA process, to demonstrate its usefulness, and to provide input to the 
revision of the INPRO manual in the area of proliferation resistance, a preliminary case study has been 
carried out by KAERI in Republic of Korea on a conceptual sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) metal fuel 
manufacturing facility (SFMF), representing novel technology in the conceptual design phase. This allows 
testing all elements of the proposed assessment process, from the early stage of design, and illustrates the 
interrelationship of the PR assessment to the safeguards-by-design process [17].  
 
The SFMF in the case study has been defined to consist of the fuel rod fabrication module and fuel 
assembly module, but excludes the pyroprocessing module for simplicity. The feed material for SFMF is 
basically U/TRU/RE/Zr ingots produced from spent SFR fuel at the pyroprocessing module. TRU stands 
for transuranics and RE rare earth elements. The building with three main modules would also include the 
waste storage, maintenance cells (located above each main process module), laboratories and utilities, and 
was designed as a 3-floor building with a basement [18].  
 
Safeguards implementation is assumed to be based on the accountancy system of the operator. Whether 
data from process control will be shared with the IAEA for safeguards purposes, or whether NMCA 
systems are to be duplicated, has to be subject to further analysis and negotiation with the IAEA in the 
course of the safeguards-by-design (SBD) process. Basic principles of NMCA and potential safeguards 
measures are that: 
• The facility is designed for remote operation, no human access to process areas except for 
maintenance due to inert gas, radiation and high temperature safety issues, 
• All SFR fuel materials to be measured and monitored in process, 
• Extensive use of unattended weighing and NDA and surveillance systems to verify 100% of the SFR 
fuel material flows in the process, 
• Extensive use of video surveillance to monitor and maintain the continuity of knowledge of SFR fuel 
materials (amounts and locations) is expected, including in the scrap recovery and product/waste 
storage areas, 
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• All NMCA/safeguards systems can be designed to accommodate automated facility operation, i.e. no 
need for the operator to shut down the process activities for interim verification, 
• Additional equipment for each NDA instrument is foreseen, such as video cameras to confirm ID 
numbers of the object or independent load cells to confirm the gross weight of the container being 
assayed, 
• All unattended NDA and surveillance systems to be suitable for “remote monitoring.” 
A coarse diversion path analysis has been carried out which does not claim to be complete, but which is 
sufficiently detailed for demonstrating the assessment process. By applying the PROSA safeguardability 
questionnaire (UR3) to each diversion path so far identified it was possible to gain an appreciation of 
where gaps exist thereby suggesting R&D opportunities to improve the long term sustainability of the 
NES. Critical areas identified include:  
• Procedures for destructive assay (DA) for the verification by the IAEA are not defined 
• Target values for non-destructive assay (NDA) for this type of nuclear material are also not defined 
• Need to finish demonstrations of NDA measurements on novel material types and material flows 
Recommendations for improvements / R&D have been associated with NDA equipment (like ASNC 
(Advanced Safeguards Neutron Coincidence Counter) or PNAR (Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity) 
instruments, etc. with 2-5 % measurement uncertainty, under development at KAERI) that is still to be 
validated and approved for use by the IAEA, with surveillance systems to make sure that held-up material 
in the equipment module (i.e., heel) cannot be removed from the process cell without detection by 
safeguards, and with discrimination capabilities between waste containers loaded with waste or with TRU 
fuel and heel/scrap.  
6. Conclusion 
 
The proposed PROSA assessment process is an improved approach to identify strengths and weaknesses 
of a system in the areas of proliferation resistance and safeguardability (UR3), which can help Member 
States to identify R&D gaps that need to be addressed in order to meet the expectations for sustainability 
of a nuclear energy system. The primary value of the assessment is to gain an appreciation of where gaps 
exist, thereby suggesting directions to pursue to improve long term sustainability of the NES. 
 
While PROSA is narrow to a specific NES sustainability self-assessment, it is complementary to the 
promotion of the SBD concept by the IAEA Department of Safeguards [9, 12]. The PROSA self-
assessment cannot replace the responsibility of the IAEA for the development of a safeguards approach 
for a specific facility; however, it provides useful information to national experts, designers and operators 
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